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OPENING HART'S CONCEPT OF LAW
RICHARD K. SHERWIN*
The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles
of a science are really the last result of metaphysical analysis practiced
on the elementary notions with which the science is conversant; and
their relation to the science is not that of foundations to an edifice,
but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well though
they be never dug down to and exposed to light.
J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism
INTRODUCTION "
It has been said that philosophy is a quest for the "beginnings"
of things.' In our psychological age,2 it may not be surprising to
discover that originary images of man confront the philosopher's
backward glance. Yet, the changes in such images from classical to
modern times are not without a curious irony. For from Aristotle's
grounding of ethical theory in the final good embodied in man's
transcendent nature,3 we rudely encounter Hobbes' hard, modern vis-
ion. In the Hobbesian psychology, man is riddled by fear of violent
death and ruled by an unquenchable passion to dominate his fellows.'
* Instructor in Law, New York University School of Law.
1. L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AN) HISTORY 83 (1953).
2. For a sample of the broad range of psychological theorizing that appears
in contemporary legal discourse, see J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 459-96 (1971)
(citing Piaget's developmental psychology to account for innate moral intelligence);
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 21-62 (1975) (discussing the liberal model of the
self in order to expose its internal contradictions); T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT,
LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 209-29 (1977) (using insights derived from
Rogerian psychology to argue for a more "humanistic" approach to legal education).
3. See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 532
(Book X, ch. 7) (R. McKeon ed. 1947) ("The good of man is an activity of the soul
in conformity with excellence or virtue." According to Aristotle, the highest virtue
is that of "the best thing in us" which may be "reason" and "also divine" or "only
the most divine element in us."). See also Irwin, The Metaphysical and Psychological
Basis n/Aristotle's Ethics, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 48-50 (A. Rorty ed. 1980);
Nagle, Aristotle on Eudaimonia, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 13 (A. Rorty ed.
1980).
4. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 447 (M Oakeshott ed. 1960) ("[It is men, and arms,
not words and promises, that make the force and power of the laws.").
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The break with classical faith in nature (including human nature) is
clean.
According to Hobbes, given the natural state of "war of every
one against everyone, ' only an absolute, coercive power can main-
tain the peaceable order that survival requires. Thus, humans may
win peace only by submitting to a compulsion which, though set up
by themselves, still remains an irrevocably external force.
Rousseau later pushed the modern transformation of man fur-
ther. Corrupted human nature could now be made over by political
power. Humans could become moral in accordance with the natural
order established by political society. Thus, with Rousseau, Hobbes'
dark vision is converted to light. The absolute power of the Hobbe-
sian sovereign is now to be realized in the will of the collective. The
once wholly external coercive sanctions now become wholly
internalized. It is against this backdrop that Rousseau writes: "I can
see no viable middle path between the rawest democracy and the most
complete Hobbesian system."'
The dilemma expressed by Rousseau has, in one form or another,
resounded within jurisprudential thinking down to the present day.
On the one hand, we see legal positivists strive to maximize certainty
by adverting to objective criteria (or "tests") by which the existence
of valid rules may be verified. Characteristically, this attempt involves
an external viewpoint based on behavioral observation. Austin's theory
of law as commands backed by threats is illustrative of this view-
point. On the other hand, natural jurists quest for inner moral stand-
ards according to which "valid" laws achieve authentic legality. In-
ternalized sanctions and moral properties intrinsic to law itself are
characteristic of this viewpoint.
Thus the debate, in large part, proceeds on the basis of the role
one assigns to moral theory. The positivist insists that legal obliga-
tion may be based on coercive sanctions; law's validity is indepen-
dent of its moral status. The natural lawyer, by contrast, builds moral
theory into his analysis of what legal obligation means.7
In The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart charts a middle path that
seems to go far toward answering Rousseau's dilemma. Hart's con-
5. Id. at 80-83.
6. 33 J. ROUSSEAU, CORRESPONDENCE COMPLETE 243 (R. Leigh ed. 1979) (letter
to Victor Riquetti, Marquis de Mirabeau, July 26, 1767: "Je ne vois point de milieu
supportable entre la plus austbre d6mocratie et le Hobbisme le plus parfait.").
7. Hoffmaster, Professor Hart on Legal Obligation, 11 GA. L. REV. 1303,
1320-21 (1977); Richards, Rules, Policies and Neutral Principles, 11 GA. L. REV. 1069
(1977).
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ceptual analysis supplies a typology of rules that corrects the inade-
quacy of Austin's simplistic model of law. Crucial to Hart's notion
of social rules is the central role he gives to the "internal viewpoint"
which such rules embrace. The internal viewpoint allows Hart to
account for internalized normative standards on the basis of which
one's own actions and the actions of others may be critically appraised.
One may suggest that Hart's "descriptive sociology"' takes his
typology of rules further by ultimately grounding their normative con-
tent in what Hart calls "natural necessity."9 This involves those
truisms about humans and the world which constitute Hart's
"minimum content of natural law."" By virtue of his typology of rules
and descriptive sociology, Hart may claim to have preserved the
positivist's view of legal validity and the natural lawyer's search for
normative standards that ensure the legitimate power or authority
of the legal system.
In this essay, I will examine the extent to which Hart's "middle
path" may be deemed successful. Specifically, I will appraise The Con-
cept of Law on the basis of the criteria for legitimate power that Hart
provides. I will conclude that in their current form Hart's typology
of rules and minimum content of natural law do not guarantee the
legitimate authority of the legal system. I will suggest, however, that
Hart's key insight concerning the internal viewpoint may be broadened
so as to rectify this result. Opening Hart's concept of law" to what
I will call a normative grammar (not encompassed by Hart's essen-
tially descriptive analysis of legal obligation) is the heart of the
extension I will propose.12 A corresponding shift in the image of man
underlying Hart's analysis may also be required.'3
8. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW v (1961).
9. Id. at 195.
10. Id.
11. By suggesting that Hart's concept of law may be "opened" to embrace
more than the definitive and descriptive sets of criteria that Hart provides, I hope
to encourage a resonance with Morris Weitz's notion of "open concepts." See M.
WEITZ, THE OPENING MIND x, 4-5 (1978) (Weitz argues that the absence of necessary
and sufficient criteria need not render a concept ambiguous).
12. That legal positivists such as Hart unself-consciously endorse a core of
normative tenets (for example, in the form of an unexplained and unsupported-
though not necessarily insupportable-theory of the self) is one of the points this
essay seeks to make. A correlative goal is to subject such normative commitments
to self-conscious scrutiny so that responsibility for upholding them, including the
responsibility to explain and justify them in discourse with others, will not be evaded.
Legitimation itself has been viewed as this very process of explaining and justifying.
See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 93 (1967).
13. The shift I hint at in this essay involves the move from Hartian descriptive
sociology ("this is the way things/people are") (see infra text accompanying notes 48-
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In the first section, I set out the criteria for legitimate power
or authority upon which I will be relying in my analysis. I also pre-
sent the two minimum conditions that Hart regards as both necessary
and sufficient for the existence of a mature legal system. In the sec-
ond section, I examine Hart's typology of rules. I conclude, based on
significant ambiguities in Hart's typological analysis, that neither the
two minimum conditions nor the criteria for legitimate authority have
been met. In the third section, I examine Hart's minimum content
of natural law and suggest that it fails to resolve the previously rais-
ed difficulties concerning Hartian social rules. In addition, I contend
that it also fails to generate a minimum moral content in which to
root normative standards that social rules embrace. I conclude that
Austin's notion of coercive obligation and Kelsen's claim that law may
have any content, contentions firmly rejected by Hart, 4 are not
precluded by Hart's minimum content.
To remedy this difficulty, I offer the extension to which reference
already has been made. While the proposed extension lacks refine-
ment, and could benefit greatly from additional critical reflection, I
am confident that something like it is necessary to preserve the
jurisprudential advance that Hart's proposed "middle path" provides.
I. THE CRITERIA FOR LEGITIMATE POWER
AND THE Two MINIMUM CONDITIONS
In The Concept of Law, Hart distinguishes legal from merely coer-
cive obligation. The latter, which Hart associates with Austin's theory
of law as commands backed by threats, is rejected by Hart as entirely
too simplistic. 15 As a corrective to Austin's model, Hart proposes his
notion of social rules. These rules, by virtue of the internal viewpoint,
55), to an active hermeneutic ("this is the best way to understand the meaning of
self, others and events in this particular context, at this particular time"). See infra
text accompanying notes 33-36.
Ethics in the Aristotelian sense, as a search for the meaning of virtue, provides
a model for normative discourse of the kind I am suggesting. Hermeneutics, understood
as the ongoing search for contextualized (i.e., historical) meanings, may provide a
way of adapting this Aristotelian model to our largely secularized cultural milieu.
Man's freedom, rather than his transcendent nature, now becomes the basis on which
ethical reality relies. See W. LUIJPEN, PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL LAW 213 (1967).
See also J. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 60 (H. Barnes trans. 1966) ("Human
freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of the human
being is suspended in his freedom."); J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING
175 (1984) (describing the ways in which "[W]e constitute ourselves and our relations
with other people when we use, and in using recreate, the language that makes us
what we are.").
14. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 47-48, 203.
15. Id. at 26.
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account for something more than habitual obedience or predictions
of behavior-objectively observable phenomena which reflect the
response to force that characterizes Austin's jurisprudence. In place
of obedience to coercion, (what Hart calls "being obliged"), Hart's
model of rules requires voluntary acceptance of authority.'"
Hart's understanding of social rules, and the central role of the
internal viewpoint, will be examined in more detail later on. For the
moment, this bare outline may serve to introduce the idea of legitimate
power or authority. Authority, in this context, points to a distinction
between the factual validity of orders or rules on the one hand, and
the belief in their legitimacy or potential for justification on the other."
This notion warrants fuller elucidation. Hart's analysis of Austin's in-
ability to account for rules of succession may serve as a first step.
According to Hart, "being obliged" to obey orders (Austin's habit
of obedience) fails to confer any right of succession upon individual
rule-makers. Upon the ruler's death there exists no basis for the con-
tinuity of command. The habit of obedience enjoyed by the dead ruler
(Rex I) no longer exists, and, according to Hart, "it does not even
render probable that Rex II will be habitually obeyed."' 8 In short,
there is nothing to make Rex II sovereign from the start.
Austin's failure, Hart claims, stems from the fact that habits of
obedience do not generate the notion of a rule.'9 According to Hart,
the authority to make rules requires general acceptance of a normative
social rule of succession. Because the acceptance of a rule of succes-
sion constitutes the existence of that rule, "its acceptance affords
. . . grounds both for the statement of law that the successor has a
right to legislate, even before he starts to do so, and for the state-
ment of fact that he is likely to receive the same obedience as his
predecessor does."2
Put simply, the ruler will not only have a right to rule (based
on acceptance of the rule of succession), but it also will be generally
accepted that it is right to obey him. The ruler's word will now
generate "standards of behavior, not orders."2'
The criteria for legitimate power may now be stated explicitly.
In this regard, I will employ Michael Payne's terms de jure and de
16. Id. at 198.
17. Id. at 53. For an alternative understanding of forms of legitimation, see
2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 952-54 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1978).
18. H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 54.
19. Id. at 73.
20. Id. at 57-58.
21. Id. at 57.
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facto authority as the constituent elements of legitimate power or
authority.' The term de jure authority may be used to describe Rex
II's right or title to succeed Rex I. As Payne suggests, to say that
someone has de jure authority is to claim that he has a right to do
something, and therefore presupposes a system of rules establishing
that right.23
The term de facto authority may be used to describe a distinc-
tive kind of obedience. Unlike the response to fear, the kind of obe-
dience involved here may roughly be. said to involve "respect" or
"trust." This type of obedience is to be distinguished from obedience
out of fear of punishment (Hart's notion of being obliged) or out of
habit. 4
Notably, a ruler may enjoy de jure authority without also enjoy-
ing de facto authority. For example, a ruler may have the de jure right
to give orders, but those orders may be obeyed out of fear or habit
(in which case he lacks defacto authority). Conversely, defacto author-
ity does not necessitate de jure authority. For example, although
unauthorized under a rule of primogeniture, the youngest brother of
Rex II may possess the defacto authority that a very unpopular Rex
II lacks. 5
Legitimate power or authority, then, may be used to describe
a ruler who possesses both de jure and de facto authority. In Hart's
terms, Rex will have the right to specify what is to be done and it
will be accepted that it is right to obey him."
With this introduction of the criteria for legitimate power, we
have encountered two different types of rules which will require
further elucidation. Before taking up that task, however, I would like
to present Hart's statement regarding the two minimum conditions
which he claims are both necessary and sufficient for the existence
of a modern legal system. Hart states:
There are therefore two minimum conditions necessary and
sufficient for the existence of a legal system. On the one
hand, those rules of behavior which are valid according to
the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally
22. Payne, Hart's Concept of a Legal System, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 287,
302-03 (1976).
23. Id. at 302.
24. Id. at 303.
25. Id.
26. H.L.A. HART, supr4 note 8, at 56-57.
[Vol. 20
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obeyed, and on the other hand, its rules of recognition
specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of
change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as
common public standards of official behavior by its officials.
The first condition is the only one which private citizens
need satisfy: they may obey 'each for his part only' and from
any motive whatever . . . the second condition must also
be satisfied by the officials of the system. They must regard
these as common standards of official behavior and appraise
critically their own and each other's deviations as lapses
.... The assertion that a legal system exists is therefore
a Janus-faced statement looking both towards obedience by
ordinary citizens and to the acceptance by officials of secon-
dary rules as critical common standards of official behavior.'
Hart regards the union of the two types of rules expressed in
the foregoing passage as the new "key" to the science of
jurisprudence.28 I have quoted this passage at length here because
it will serve a critical role in my subsequent analysis of Hart's con-
cept of law. To begin unpacking this statement, I now turn to Hart's
typology of rules.
II. THE HARTIAN TYPOLOGY OF RULES
We have seen in the example of rules of succession that while
the Austinian command model of law may account for habits of obe-
dience it fails to generate a notion of rules in the Hartian sense. But
what exactly is the Hartian sense? What are social rules? Hart says:
[I1f a social rule is to exist, some [members of the social
group in question] at least must look on the behavior in
question as a general standard to be followed by the group
as a whole. A social rule has an internal aspect in addition
to the external aspect which it shares with a social habit
and which consists in the regular uniform behavior which
an observer could record.'
Clearly, then, the "internal aspect" is crucial in distinguishing
social rules from mere habits of obedience. By the internal viewpoint,
(what Hart also calls the 'critical reflective attitude'), Hart is refer-
ring to the acceptance of normative standards on the basis of which
27. Id. at 113.
28. Id. at 79.
29. Id. at 55.
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justifiable criticism may be directed toward certain patterns of
behavior.' In short, deviation is not only met with pressures for con-
formity, but it also constitutes of itself a good reason for criticism
by others or for self-criticism.31 Characteristically, the expression of
such criticism is in normative terms, such as "ought," "must," "should,"
"right" and "wrong." 2
It has been suggested that the key advance in Hart's concept
of social rules consists in his notion of the internal viewpoint, or what
MacCormick calls the "hermeneutic" attitude.33 "Hermeneutic" in this
context refers to the interpretation of judgments from the point of
view of the person who passes judgment rather than the person who
scrutinizes behavior from the outside. Thus, in order to accept a social
rule one must adopt an internal point of view from which normative
statements can be made either giving reasons for or justifying cer-
tain patterns of behavior or for criticizing that behavior.
A limitation in Hart's analysis may be noted here. Hart fails to
account for an understanding of normative standards from the inter-
nal point of view that does not actively endorse such standards. 4 It
is true, as MacCormick is quick to point out, that for an uncommitted
understanding of normative standards to exist an active commitment
to such standards on the part of someone or some people must either
be postulated or presupposed. 5 Standing alone, however, Hart's
analysis fails to distinguish active from passive acceptance of nor-
mative standards. 3
30. Id.
31. Id. at 54.
32. Id. at 56.
33. N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 29-30 (1981).
34. Id. at 33-35.
35. Id. at 39.
36. The notion of "passive acceptance" seems to comport with what Alan
Gibbard has described as being "in the grip of" a norm. See Gibbard, Moral Judgment
and the Acceptance of Norn, ; 96 ETHICs 5, 14-17 (Oct. 1985).
According to Gibbard, aside from accepting a norm (as right or reasonable)
one may also be compelled by certain "cravings" or "appetites" (such as the felt need
to survive) (see infra text accompanying notes 62-65), or by "weakness of will." The
latter involves something one may not believe is right to do but which deference to
conventional norms of politeness or cooperation may lead one to do. To illustrate
this "weakness," Gibbard cites the famous Milgram experiment in which subjects
complied with orders to induce (simulated) electric shocks to strangers as part of an
"experiment." Two thirds of the subjects complied despite their misgivings about
the "wrongness" of their actions. Cf infra text accompanying note 83.
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A further difficulty in Hart's analysis stems from his failure
clearly to distinguish between "principles" and other "standards" that
do not function as "rules." According to Hart, principles, rules and
standards "belong to morality and make conduct morally obligatory.""a
But clearly some shared standards or principles are not employed as
rules. For example, certain standards of decency are accorded neither
the pressure to conformity nor the importance of aims accorded to
rules. Nevertheless, standards are often used in conjunction with rules
for the purpose of interpreting or critically appraising them.38
To make good on Hart's omission in this regard, MacCormick
helpfully suggests that principles may be regarded as "rational grounds
of conduct" that are "general in their scope." Rules, by contrast, may
be viewed as essentially conventional and thus may be, in a sense,
arbitrary in the specific form they take.39 The key here is that rules
are adhered to so long as they are and continue to be accepted by
common or convergent preferences among those whom the activity
in question involves. When questions arise concerning the interpreta-
tion of rules or their analogical development (viz. other rules), prin-
ciples or other standards of value come into central focus.
In short, standards of judgment and interpretation fulfill an im-
portant function for which rules alone simply cannot account."0
Moreover, that rules change in response to principles propounded by
critical moralists suggests that principles are a part of the rules
themselves. For how else can we account for the fact that the critically
appraised rules (perhaps in turn adjusted) come to reflect the adjusted
moral position that was propounded?41
We have seen that a rule differs from an order at least to the
extent that it sets a standard of behavior that binds an individual
from the internal point of view. Physical power alone cannot suffice.
We have also seen from the example of Hart's rule of succession that
a ruler must have authority to issue the rule or it cannot be deemed
a rule as such. The rule issued, and the rule that authorizes its
issuance, point to the two types of social rules whose union, accord-
ing to Hart, constitutes the heart of the legal system.
37. H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 163.
38. N. MACCORMICK, supra note 33, at 63-65.
39. Id. at 41.
40. For an incisive development of this insight, see R. DWORKIN, Tile Model
of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
41. N. MACCORMICK, supra note 33, at 54.
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Rules of the first type are primary rules of obligation. These
rules impose duties such as those that forbid murder or robbery. Rules
of the second type are called secondary rules. They "confer powers,
public or private."4 Secondary rules stipulate how and by whom
primary rules may be formed, recognized, modified or replaced. Rules
about forming contracts, for example, are secondary rules because they
stipulate how specific rules governing particular legal obligations come
into existence or are changed. 3
According to Hart, primitive communities only have primary
rules. They are binding because members of the group through its
social practices accept the rules as standards of behavior. A society
of this kind maintains a set of separate standards which must be ac-
cepted by a majority, otherwise those members who reject the rules
would have too little social pressure to fear deviation."
Such a society, Hart claims, suffers from three serious defects.
First, it lacks any procedure for determining what the rules are or
what their precise scope is. The "uncertainty" generated as a result
is cured by a secondary rule of recognition. This rule provides specific
criteria according to which valid rules may be clearly ascertained. A
second defect stems from the primitive society's lack of any means
of deliberately adapting their primary rules to changing circumstances.
This "static" character of primary rules requires secondary rules of
change in order to empower an individual or body of persons to in-
troduce new primary rules and to eliminate old ones. The third defect
from which primitive societies suffer stems from the inefficiency of
diffuse social pressure by which rules are maintained. Such societies
lack any official agency to determine authoritatively the fact of viola-
tion of rules and the kind of remedial action that is required. Second-
ary rules of adjudication are thus necessary to remedy this third
defect.5
We have noted that according to the two minimum conditions
which Hart deems necessary and sufficient to the existence of a
mature legal system primary rules must be obeyed by citizens and
secondary rules must be accepted by officials. It follows that if the
distinction between the two rules breaks down the two minimum con-
ditions may not be fulfilled. There is reason to suggest that the distinc-
tion does in fact break down.
42. H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 79.
43. See id. at 94.
44. Id. at 89.
45. Id. at 89-91.
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Hart's understatement of the role of standards and principles
in the legal system has already been noted. Additional difficulties also
arise due to serious ambiguities in the way Hart defines primary and
secondary rules. For example, on the one hand, Hart distinguishes
between those rules which lay down categorical requirements (duties
or obligations) and those that confer power. On the other hand, he
states that secondary rules can all be said to be on a different level
from primary rules, for they are "parasitic upon" or "about" such
rules."6 However, many secondary power-conferring rules do not con-
cern primary rules, especially those that confer powers on private
individuals. Moreover, the rule of recognition, which specifies the
criteria for legal validity, need not be a power-conferring rule at all.
Rather, it may be described as determinative of a source of law. Ac-
cordingly, it does not necessarily give power to someone to legislate.
That power derives from the rules that Hart calls rules of change.47
Further, secondary rules of power at times seem to function not
as power-conferring rules but rather as duty-imposing rules. For
example, Hart claims that officials such as judges must accept rules
of recognition and abide by the dictates of the internal point of view
regarding a "public, common standard of correct judicial decision, and
not as something each judge merely obeys for his own part only."48
In other words, the rule of recognition may impose duties upon
officials.
From the above it may be argued that Hart's two minimum con-
ditions concerning primary and secondary rules are neither necessary
nor sufficient for the existence of a legal system. They are insuffi-
cient because they fail to account for the important role principles
and other standards play in the interpretation and judgment of rules.
Nor can they explain the critical process by which rules are adjusted
and, in the process, come to embody those moral standards which were
critically propounded. In addition, the serious inconsistencies and
ambiguities in Hart's distinctions between primary and secondary rules
make doubtful their current viability as the necessary criteria which
Hart's minimum conditions require. The following observations further
reinforce this conclusion.
So far we have seen that Hart's union of primary and secondary
rules maintains the legal positivist position by providing criteria for
46. Id. at 78-79. See also Payne, supra note 22, at 300; N. MACCORMICK, supra
note 33, at 107.
47. Payne, supra note 22, at 315.
48. H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 112.
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verification (based upon rules of recognition) according to which valid
laws may be ascertained. On this account, primary rules may be
accepted simply as valid based on the applicable rules of recognition.
Yet, Hart also maintains that social rules are accepted from the in-
ternal point of view as normative standards of conduct. Several dif-
ficulties emerge here.
To begin with, as already noted, Hart only requires citizens to
obey primary rules, not to accept them. For their part, officials are
required only to accept secondary rules. Thus, it would appear that
Hart requires no one to accept primary rules. But, as Payne points
out,' 9 if this is so, how can they be considered social rules in the first
place (since the prerequisite for such rules is their acceptance by at
least some social group members in accordance with the internal view-
point)? And if they cannot, how can they be deemed necessary for
the existence of the legal system?
A proposed solution to this difficulty is that because rules of
recognition accepted by officials establish valid primary rules, members
of the society are "committed to the acceptance in advance of [such]
general classes of rule, marked out by general criteria of validity."'
It may also be argued that whether or not anyone is required to accept
the primary rules is irrelevant since accepted secondary rules of
change will empower officials to introduce new primary rules which
citizens also are committed in advance to accept. 1
This response is hardly dispositive of the difficulties it must ad-
dress. For one thing, citizen acceptance of primary rules in advance
of their being promulgated (based on official acceptance of rules of
recognition and change) cannot be squared with Hart's two minimum
criteria which plainly do not require such acceptance. Thus, Hart must
either alter his minimum criteria to require citizens to accept primary
rules, or his notion of rules of obligation (as social rules) may need
to be rethought. In any event, the notion of acceptance in advance
may be challenged in light of the coercive obligatoriness of the official
"authority" to which citizens may be "obliged" to submit. It is here
where the issue of legitimate power comes to the fore. Indeed, I will
contend that so long as citizens are required merely to obey primary
rules, that obedience may not necessarily extend beyond coercive
obligation. Yet, it is precisely this goal that characterizes Hart's efforts
to supplant the Austinian model of law as command backed by threats.
49. Payne, supra note 22, at 310.
50. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 229. See also Payne, supra note 22,
at 310-11.
51. Payne, supra note 22, at 315.
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Given official acceptance of secondary rules, nothing in Hart's
typology of rules precludes officials from promulgating rules based
on official self-interest alone. As Hart makes clear, acceptance may
be founded upon many different considerations, including calculation
of long-term interests.2 Notably, social rules are not necessarily moral
rules. Indeed, they may be accepted or rejected on moral grounds.
But an official rule based on self-interest is neither necessary nor suf-
ficient for defacto authority. It is not necessary because citizens could
conceivably accept official rules on moral grounds. It is not sufficient
because self-interested obedience does not necessarily generate the
kind of obedience that is distinctive of de facto authority (i.e., trust
in official rules as "right," as opposed to obedience based on fear).
Thus, since officials may rule with de jure authority founded on
coercive tactics in their own, but not the majority of citizens' interests,
their rule need not receive other than coerced obedience. Deprived
of de facto authority the legal system will operate in the absence of
legitimate power. Austin's "gunman writ large" has not necessarily
been surpassed.
Finally, a circularity that runs through Hart's analysis regarding
the officials' acceptance of secondary rules may be noted. Although
I will state the circularity here, whether or not it can be resolved
within the framework of Hart's concept of law poses a question that
can be addressed fully only in the next section, where Hart's minimum
content of natural law will be examined.
Hart argues that the social (secondary) rule imposes a legal
obligation upon officials based on the behavior and expectations of
other officials in the same legal system. What this fails to explain is
the reason or reasons why a particular obligation (or primary rule)
withdraws one action from the range of an individual's free choice
but not another.' The issue of "natural necessity" is implicated here
and thus will require our fuller attention in the next section.
It has been suggested that Hart's notion of the internal view-
point is the key to his concept of law. It permits him to retain exter-
nal observations about the validity of law (based upon accepted rules
of recognition) while also accounting for normative statements that
reflect the internal viewpoint of those who accept social rules. By
charting a middle way between untestable moral obligation on the
one hand, and clear, but coercive obligation on the other, Hart's con-
cept of the modern legal system aims to escape the dual evils of law
52. H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 112, 198-99.
53. See Hoffmaster, supra note 7, at 1214-15.
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as command backed by threats and law as wholly internalized (moral)
sanctions. Instead, however, we have uncovered so far a typology of
rules that is deeply inconsistent, and a legal system generated by
the union of Hart's two rules that fails to ensure that coercive obliga-
tion will be avoided.
If there is a way out of this difficulty for Hart, it may be said
to rest with the normative standards which the internal viewpoint
embraces. If there is a minimum normative content that exists by
"natural necessity" in all societies, as Hart claims, then Kelsen's arch-
positivist view that law can have any content can be overcome.
Moreover, if "natural necessity" can explain the ordinary citizen's
acceptance of (or, in Shiner's phrase, "acquiescence to") the fundamen-
tal rules of recognition, as Shiner claims it can,' then de facto authority
may be established- and along with it legitimate power or authority.
Underlying these issues is the previously noted question concern-
ing what I claim is a circularity in Hart's thinking with respect to
official acceptance of secondary rules. The difficulty may be put in
the following way. The rule of recognition imposes legal obligations
on officials of the system but is not itself valid (i.e., there are no
ulterior rules validating this type of secondary rule)." Thus, the prin-
ciple that legal validity establishes legal obligation cannot explain the
legal obligations that secondary rules impose. But if this is so, on what
basis is official restraint upon individual freedom justified? It is with
these issues in mind that I turn now to Hart's notion of the minimum
content of natural law.
III. HART'S MINIMUM CONTENT OF NATURAL LAW
In The Concept of Law Hart expressly relies upon three kinds
of statements.5 If his typology of rules encompasses two kinds of
statements, ordinary statements of fact and definitions, it is in his
account of natural law where we encounter the third, namely, con-
tingent statements. Hart describes the latter as statements "the truth
of which is contingent on human beings and the world they live in
retaining the salient features which they have. '57 It is with contingent
54. Shiner, Hart and Hobbes, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 201, 223 (1980).
55. Hart describes rules of recognition as "ultimate" secondary rules. This
means that they provide the criteria by which the validity of other rules of the
system is assessed. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 102. The other secondary (non-
ultimate) rules are rules of adjudication and change. See supra text accompanying
notes 43-45.
56. H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 195.
57. Id.
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statements that Hart aims to generate the minimum content of natural
law. This content, Hart claims, forms an essential part of the
framework of any complex society's form of life.
Hart's basic argument for the minimum content of natural law
is simply that "without such a content law and morals could not for-
ward the minimum purpose of survival which humans have in
associating with each other."' Given survival as the fundamental aim
of humans "{rleflection on some very obvious generalizations -indeed
truisms -concerning human nature and the world in which men live,
show that as long as these hold good, there are certain rules of con-
duct which any social organization must contain if it is to be viable." 9
The truisms in question consist in the "obvious" observations that
humans are vulnerable to bodily harm; they are approximately equal
in strength and intelligence; they have limited altruism and thus are
neither angels nor devils; they have limited understanding and
strength of will; and that limited resources exist in the world. Given
this reality concerning humans and the world, according to Hart it
is a "natural necessity" that there be sanctions to ensure the minimum
forms of protection for persons, property and promises.'
In light of this descriptive (sociological) approach to natural law,
I now turn to the question of whether Hart's minimum content ac-
counts for official de facto authority by providing a justification for
citizens voluntarily to accept official rule. Preliminarily, several ini-
tial questions need be addressed. First, is the minimum content of
natural law as essential as Hart says it is? With one minor qualifica-
tion I submit that it is. I will pursue the qualification first.
Earlier we noted that Hart's emphasis upon social rules parallels
his understatement of principles and other normative standards which
do not function as rules. Following MacCormick, I distinguished rules
from standards by pointing out an element of arbitrariness in the
former that stemmed from their conventionality; that is, rules are
accepted as rules so long as they are, and continue to be, actually
preferred in practice. Standards, by contrast, not only lack such ar-
bitrariness, but they also do not function in the same cut and dried
fashion as rules.
It may be concluded from this analysis that the minimum con-
tent of natural law need not consist of primary rules, as Hart claims,
58. Id. at 189.
59. Id. at 188.
60. Id. at 188-89.
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but rather of primary shared standards. In any event, the fact re-
mains that absent some such standards or rules a mode of coercion
or pressure to conformity to contain individual aggression could not
be arrived at. As Hart puts it:
[Sanctions serve as] a guarantee that those who would volun-
tarily obey shall not be sacrificed to those who would not.
To obey, without this, would risk going to the wall."1
The key sentence to note is the one that follows immediately after
the above-quoted passage: "Given this standing danger, what reason
demands is voluntary cooperation in a coercive system." 2
Clearly, the element of volition is crucial if Hart's notion of
"acceptance" is to be maintained. But does volition here ensure the
kind of acceptance upon which legitimate power depends? I contend
it does not. If I am right, official acceptance of the minimum content
of natural law fails to provide adequate justification for constraining
the range of individual freedom beyond the Hobbesian model of coer-
cive obligation.
Hart's truisms may require voluntary submission to sanctions,
but the Hobbesian power-based system of order (rooted in positive
justice alone) requires no less. I contend that Hart's legal system may
prompt general submission to a system of coercive rules of obliga-
tion, promulgated by wholly self-interested officials, without violating
Hart's minimum content of natural law.
The aim of peaceable order which underpins Hobbesian civil
society-by which the aim of survival is assured-is the rule of law
backed by force. 3 It may be suggested, however, that sanctions con-
stitute a formal prerequisite to any system of peaceable order, but
do not guarantee any specific content beyond the maintenance of that
order. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Kelsen in agreement with
Hart regarding survival as the fundamental aim underlying the legal
system.
According to Professor Shiner, the internal viewpoint sets Hart's
concept of the legal system apart from Hobbes'. 4 As we have seen,
however, and as Shiner ultimately concedes, it is precisely the inter-
nal viewpoint that is not ensured by Hart's typology of rules with
61. Id. at 193.
62. Id.
63. T. HOBBES, supra note 4, at 84-87.
64. Shiner, supra note 54, at 217.
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respect to citizens' general obedience to primary rules of obligation.
Shiner's attempt to derive general acceptance from Hart's notion of
"natural necessity" by some unspecified "metaphysical" grounding is
his way out of this difficulty. A little later on, I will examine, and
find wanting, Shiner's proposal. Before that, however, a prior issue
must be addressed.
The preceding analysis treats Hart's minimum content as a prere-
quisite to formal, but not necessarily moral order. If a minimum moral
content existed, as Hart claims, not only would officials be entitled
to obedience, but also Kelsen's claim that law may have any content
would be repudiated. I contend, however, that Hart's minimum con-
tent presupposes a compelling (imperative) norm that at most is "pre-
moral"; it does not necessarily generate moral content.
Hoffmaster has claimed that the minimum content of natural law
may constitute a "principle of fairness."65 He argues that mutual
forebearance and compromise are at the "base of both legal and moral
obligation" (which comprise Hart's minimum content of natural law).
Hoffmaster acknowledges, as he must, that this "ground of moral right
... is not made explicit by Hart." However, he insists that it is sug-
gested by Hart's "worry about people trying to obtain the advantages
of the system without accepting the burdens.""
I maintain that the "moral right" to which Hoffmaster refers
cannot be deemed a necessary attribute of Hart's minimum content.
My argument turns, in part, upon what has been dubbed the "im-
perative fallacy." It is a variation of what G.E. Moore called the
"naturalistic fallacy" 7 and stems originally from the work of Hume,
who claimed that "ought" statements cannot be derived from "is"
statements.
H.J. McCloskey has observed that "the whole point, the thing
chiefly involved in adopting the moral standpoint, is a willingness to
subordinate our own interests to what is right and obligatory."' 9
65. Hoffmaster, supra note 7, at 1316.
66. Id. at 1317.
67. G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 9-11 (1903).
68. D. HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 521 (E. Mossner ed. 1969).
69. H. MCCLOSKEY, META-ETHICS AND NORMATIVE ETHICS 77 (1969). See also
J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 60 (0. Piest ed. 1957); MacCormick, A Moralistic Case for
A-Moralistic Law?, 20 VAL. U.L. REV. 1, 12 (1985) ("It is of the essence of a moral
life that it consists in and rests on the free, that is, the uncoerced choice of right
ways of acting for their own sake or for the sake of their consequences viewed in
a disinterested way.").
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Notably, this is consistent with Hart's notion of the internal view-
point. As we have seen, the internal viewpoint manifests the adop-
tion of a normative standard that generates legitimate ("justifiable")
criticism regarding one's own and other's behavior. This viewpoint
may be said either to embody or at least to presuppose active com-
mitment to a shared standard of conduct or underlying value. The
key to the internal viewpoint, and consequently to Hart's notion of
social rules in general, lies in its stark contrast with the externality
of sanctions that accompany Austinian "commands." The Hartian
critical reflective attitude generates an internal sanction that informs
judgment. It is right in itself and appeals to an individual's conscience
in addition to cruder threats of punishment or social ostracism. 0
As MacCormick has argued, a norm that guides judgment and
underpins human action which is susceptible of no ulterior underlying
reason concerning the approval of, or preference for certain conduct,
may be described as "good in itself' or as an ultimate, as distinct
from a merely instrumental or derivative, value." Ultimate values can-
not proceed by way of demonstration or proof." The acceptance of
social rules, then, may be described as the voluntary endorsement
of some normative standard or value that serves as a basis for
judgment.
Granting the validity of the above analysis, Hart's notion of sur-
vival may be described as an ultimate value. It provides a reason for
fundamental rules which, taken together with certain truisms about
humans and the world, constitute the minimum content of natural law.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, survival lacks essential features of
morality.
Most significantly, survival is not distinguishable from a merely
instrumental or derivative value; it does not function as a basis for
concern towards the other, nor does it appeal to individual conscience.
Indeed, as Hart's phrase "natural necessity" suggests, survival and
the minimum content can generate imperative, but. not prescriptive
statements. Survival may give rise to the command "Thou shalt not
kill," but "Thou shalt not kill" does not mean the same as "You ought
70. Hart notes that those who accept and use rules from the internal viewpoint
("as guides to the conduct of social life") are normally the majority. By contrast, the
tacit endorser of norms assumes the status of an outsider within society. See H.L.A.
HART, supra note 8, at 87-88; supra text accompanying note 35.
71. N. MACCORMICK, supra note 33, at 48.
72. Id. Cf. J.S. MILL, supra note 69, at 4 (quote found on the title page of
this article).
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not to kill."73 As MacCormick states, "it is by no means evident that
'ought' is derivable from 'shall' or 'shall' from 'ought'."7' Thus a rule
or command does not necessarily give rise to a prescription-as Kelsen
and Hare incorrectly thought.
5
That survival fails as a moral "ought" may be demonstrated by
the following. Since it lacks a principle that can be universally applied
to others, one may assert that survival "justifies" a convict's murder
of his executioner, or the fleeing of a soldier from battle (after hav-
ing been conscripted to fight in a presumably "just" war). Notably,
surviving or not surviving is not necessarily determined in terms of
"right" or "wrong." No appeal to a value or the right of the other
to live is made. In short, there is no basis here for disinterest or
appeal to conscience. It may be said, then, that survival is consistent
with pre-moral reflection, and may even be a prerequisite for moral
reflection. But it does not of itself necessarily manifest moral content.
Notably, Hobbes accepted these consequences (murder and flee-
ing from battle) as logically consistent with survival as a fundamen-
tal social aim." It is hardly plausible, however, that conscience, a chief
attribute of the internal viewpoint, could endorse such actions.
To summarize the argument, as a matter of observation we may
agree with Hart that people universally disapprove of murder.
Sociologically speaking, this observation may be susceptible of verifica-
tion or disproof by means of empirical research. But if we take a step
further, and ask the meaning of the statement "murder is morally
wrong," we find no provision within Hart's analysis for a response.
73. Hart characterizes such commands as the "imperative mood." H.L.A.
HART, supra note 8, at 18.
74. MacCormick, Legal Obligation and the Imperative Fallacy, in OXFORD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 100 (A. Simpson 2d ed. 1973).
75. Id. at 109. See H. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 69, at 66-80.
76. T. HOBBES, supra note 4, at 142-43. See also Krygier, The Concept of Law
and Social Theory, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 155, 180 (1982):
[Q]uite apart from the fact that Hart has chosen to rest with "truisms"
about the human condition, these are truisms of a specifically individualist,
pre-sociological kind. . . .Certainly, there are elements common to law
and morality in all societies, such as incest, taboos, rules regarding
kinship, marriage and descent, the existence of which needs to be ex-
plained. A methodological individualist might explain such phenomena in
terms of universal individual purposes other than survival; a functionalist
sociologist might identify "social functions" which are necessary if certain
forms of social organization are to persist despite the passing of indi-
viduals. In either case, the minimum content of natural law is unlikely
to survive unscathed.
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Put simply, it may be descriptively accurate to say people generally
disapprove of murder, but from the fact that people generally believe
murder is wrong, the conclusion does not necessarily follow that it
is wrong to kill. Indeed, to draw such a conclusion would be to in-
dulge in the naturalistic fallacy of deriving ought from is. Thus, there
seems to be no analytical or empirical means within Hart's approach
to support truth claims about the wrongness of murder (or, for that
matter, the rightness of survival).
It is possible to rejoin that Hart did not intend to make truth
claims about morality. But the fact remains that absent such claims
Hart's reliance upon a minimum "moral" content of the law remains
dubious. He cannot plausibly identify a minimum moral order (and
thus provide a minimum "ought" content for the law) simply by
describing social conventions (the "is")." Nor will specific reference
to "survival" remedy the problem. As already noted, the felt need
to survive represents a pre-moral, self-interested attitude. This
attitude-rooted in fear (of death) or desire (for security)-need make
no appeal to conscience or moral principle. Indeed, as Hobbes has
shown, the desire to survive (in Hobbes' terms, the desire to escape
the "natural state" of war of all against all) readily serves to justify
abandoning the safeguards that moral principles provide against ab-
solute state power and rule by coercion.
Based on the foregoing analysis, I submit that the minimum con-
tent of natural law, as a formal pre-requisite to peaceable order (the
existence of sanctions), reflects a pre-moral attitude that cannot ground
de jure authority (the right to make rules) in de facto authority (the
right to be obeyed). In short, it fails to preclude coercive obligation.
Accordingly, Hoffmaster's claim that the minimum content involves
a "moral right" or "principle of fairness" must be rejected.
If this conclusion is correct, Hart's descriptive sociology fails to
break free of the problem of circularity that was discovered to underlie
his description of official acceptance of secondary rules. Acceptance
77. As recent history has taught, the legality of Nazi atrocities hardly conceals
the immorality of such social practices. See A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL
WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 294-95 (J. Washington ed. 1986). It is in this
sense that I emphasize the need to take active responsibility for normative com-
mitment. A meaningful statement about social morality presupposes active belief.
The "ought" is not a mere epiphenomenon. To the contrary, it has its own ontological
status; it signals a way of being and speaking among others which is uncapturable
by description alone. Indeed, it is this very insight that characterizes the advance
beyond pure legal positivism that Hart's "internal viewpoint" allows. See also L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF THE LAW 186 (1969) ("Communication is something more
than a means of staying alive. It is a way of being alive.").
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as a matter of social practice fails necessarily to yield a justification
for obedience beyond coercive obligation. I have also suggested that
the minimum content of natural law offers no solution to this difficulty.
Accordingly, Hart's concept of the legal system cannot guarantee an
escape from Kelsen's contention that law may have any content (given
its validity) or from Austin's model of coercive obligation.
The key to legitimate authority may remain embedded in Hart's
notion of the internal viewpoint and the normative standards or values
that that viewpoint embraces. Yet, Hart's staunch commitment to an
exclusively descriptive approach deprives him of the means of possess-
ing it. Thus, he remains the prisoner of a circularity engendered by
the restrictive premises upon which his thinking relies.
Shiner, while recognizing Hart's notion of the internal viewpoint
as the key to escaping from Hobbes' de facto power-based system,
insists that Hart's descriptive analysis of legal obligation is sufficient."'
He concedes that Hart's approach requires a "metaphysical grounding"
which, according to Shiner, Hart "has neither supplied nor seen the
need for."79 Unfortunately, the nature of the metaphysics involved re-
mains unclear since Shiner leaves that "for another time.""
Metaphysics aside, Shiner goes on to assume away the problem: "the
existence of legitimate legal authority is internal to man as social
animal."'"
The conceptual bridge to this assumption seems to be based upon
Shiner's view that Hart's notion of acceptance needs to be broadened.
Accordingly, Shiner proposes that although citizens do not actually
accept rules of recognition, they "acquiesce" to them. While not
equivalent, acquiescence apparently is enough acceptance to give
officials the right to be obeyed.82 But Shiner's notion of acquiescence
is far too slender a reed to bear the weight of de facto authority.
Indeed, it misses the point of Hart's most significant contribution to
jurisprudential thinking by diluting beyond recognition, if not wholly
abandoning, the cognitive and volitional elements that give the inter-
nal viewpoint, and thus Hartian social rules in general, the crucial
place they hold in Hart's legal system. It is also unconvincing.
It seems plausible that acquiescence of the kind Shiner suggests
may be obtained by a ruler unaccompanied by general trust or
78. Shiner, supra note 54, at 203.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 224.
81. Id. at 225.
82. Id. at 223.
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acknowledgement of his right to rule. The Shah of Iran and
Nicaragua's Somoza come to mind as recent historical examples of
leaders who apparently received general acquiescence until revolu-
tionary action overthrew them. Prior obedience surely was not a sign
of endorsement of official "authority.""
In short, absent the metaphysical legwork which Shiner admits
is necessary, but declines to provide, his suggestions that general
citizen "acquiesence" is "inevitable" or "internal to what it is to be
a social being"8 do not wield explanatory or persuasive force. What
they do achieve, however, is to once again bring into focus the limita-
tion that I believe may be inherent in the descriptive approach itself.
I submit that it is this limitation that forces Shiner's unwitting con-
cession to ignorance in his statement that legal obligation simply "has
to be accepted as a given."85 This may "leave legal obligation as it
is," but it hardly tells us much about what obligation is, or why it
constrains the range of individual freedom by imposing one rule of
obligation rather than another.
In the remainder of this section I propose a way out of what
may be called the descriptive dilemma. My proposal accepts Shiner's
critical observation that Hart's descriptive approach reveals
"metaphysically deep aspects . . .of the natural history of human
beings."" But I deny the value of this observation in the absence of
a non-descriptive viewpoint. The viewpoint I advocate requires a nor-
mative grammar grounded in deliberation and discourse, not
"necessity" - natural or otherwise. 7
83. Former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos' attempt to rule despite
the public's refusal to accept his authority adds a more recent example of power
without legitimacy. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1986, at 4, col. 4. Ten days prior to
Marcos' departure from the Philippines, the Catholic Bishops' Conference stated:
According to moral principles, a government that assumes power through
fraudulent means has no moral basis. For such an access to power is
tantamount to a forcible seizure and cannot command the allegiance of
the citizenry. The most we can say about such a government is that it
is a government in possession of power.
Id.
See also Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1727-28 (1984) ("Raw political power is not a legitimate basis for government
action .... ).
84. Shiner, supra note 54, at 223. For a similarly critical response to Shiner's
analysis, see Payne, Law Based on Accepted Authority, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 501
(1982).
85. Shiner, supra note 54, at 225.
86. Id.
87. See Gibbard, supra note 36, at 19:
Normative discussion consists of taking positions. . . . Consensus may
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The notion of legitimacy this suggests is one that presupposes
a mode of co-existence that in some respects may be characterized
as phenomenological. That is, man is seen as fundamental inter-
relatedness with things and others around him.8 From this viewpoint,
justice is conceived in terms of the individual's willingness to act in
accordance with the demands of the rights and duties of others. 9
In my argument, I also rely, in part, upon Mill's notion of "found-
ing principles" at the core of obedience.' I contend that this may serve
as a justifiable basis for de facto authority. By returning, then, to the
notion of ultimate values and the voluntary acceptance of founding
principles, Hart's crucial insight concerning the internal viewpoint may
be retained-and perhaps even strengthened. For here a way to en-
sure legitimate authority may be uncovered.
According to Mill, the "internal sanction," when "disinterested
and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty," is the "essence of
conscience."'" Mill identifies the deep foundation upon which this notion
of duty rests. He calls it the "first principle of morals."'2 For my pur-
pose here, I shall treat this notion as interchangeable with MacCor-
mick's term "ultimate value." Ultimate values, then, (unlike Hobbe-
sian positive justice) imply something which "it is not only right to
do, and wrong not to do, but which some individual person can claim
then be reached by a mechanism that is incipiently socratic. Discussants
hold each other to consistency in their positions, and thus force each
other to shift positions by exposing inconsistency. A person, then, must
take positions in order to engage in normative discussion responsibly,
and in doing so, he exposes himself to pressures toward consistency. To
accept a norm, we might say is to be disposed to avow it in unconstrained
normative discussion as a result of the workings of demands for con-
sistency in the positions one takes in normative discussion.
88. W. LUIJPEN, supra note 13, at 145-54. "The world cannot be separated
from the subject ... and the subject is inseparable from the world, that is, a world
which he projects himself." Id. at 142 n.105 (citing M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGIE
DE LA PERCEPTION 491 (1945)); Because there are no "given norms" . .. the decision
on which the legal order depends lies wholly in man's freedom ..... Id. at 213 (citing
E. FECHNER, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE, SOZIOLOGIE UND METAPHYSIK DES RECHTS 250-53 (1956).
Reference may also be made here to recent psychological analyses that add
to the conceptual framework of Freudian structural theory. The drive to satisfy or
thwart impulses (Freud, [Hobbes]) is supplemented by a drive toward object rela-
tionship. See, e.g., Alonso & Rutan, The Impact of Object Relations Theory on Psy-
chodynamic Group Relations, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1376, 1376-80 (1980). See also
the developmental psychologies of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg.
89. W. LUIJPEN, supra note 13, at 144, 180-81.
90. J.S. MILL, supra note 69, at 32, 36, 73, 76.
91. Id. at 36.
92. Id. at 78. For Mill this involves the "greatest happiness principle" whereby
each individual's "happiness" is counted for exactly as much as another's. Id. at 76.
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from us as his moral right."93 The articulation of general principles
about conduct serves to maintain the coherence, and promote the
realization of ultimate values.
Normative standards endorsed by the critical reflective attitude
of the internal viewpoint may be traced to ultimate values, that is,
values beyond which there is no ulterior reason or justification for
action or non-action. The rationality of principles generated by such
standards may be challenged to the extent that they are consistent
or inconsistent with such values. Ultimate values cannot be fully
accounted for by description alone. Also, the hermeneutic approach
that yields understanding of values without active commitment is in-
sufficient. Values require actual endorsement." While social practice
may evidence value acceptance, it does not constitute it. For exam-
ple, a conventional practice that gives rise to expectations of the sort
that are considered good grounds for asserting a particular duty can-
not explain the moral basis for respecting such expectations." As
Dworkin points out, the moral foundation for judgments consists in
the principle that one ought not to disappoint expectations that are
reasonably created and reasonably held.' Thus, Hart's notion of social
rules embodies a value endorsement that justifies fulfilling obligations
derived from social conventions. Those conventions, however, cannot
explain the value that generates the principled basis for judging.
Coercive obligation devalues the individual's moral intelligence
and dignity as an individual. 7 Dignity and moral intelligence presup-
pose the ability of an individual rationally to choose ultimate values
as his own ideals and bases for obedience. Locke's notion of the right
to property and our own constitutional enshrinement of the right to
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are illustrative of shared
ultimate values. These values provide reasons for trusting authority
with power; they entitle rulers to be obeyed. In short, they provide
defacto authority. Thus the legitimacy of power is rooted in a shared
consensus among citizens regarding ultimate values.
In this way, Hart's descriptive analysis of legal obligation is
preserved to the extent that normative discourse, as a phenomenon
of internal statements, exists as a social practice. However, we must
93. Id. at 62.
94. Cf. Aristotle, supra note 3, at 537. Concerning virtue, Aristotle states:
"[I1t is not enough to know, but we must try to have and use it, or try any other
way there may be of becoming good."
95. Hoffmaster, supra note 7, at 1323.
96. Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE LAW J. 855, 867 (1972).
97. See J.S. MILL, supra note 69, at 13.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 [1986], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol20/iss3/1
OPENING HART'S CONCEPT OF LAW
go beyond the minimum conditions that constitute Hart's concept of
the legal system. The requirements of legitimate power or authority
make it encumbent upon officials as well as citizens in general to
engage in committed valuational discourse so that ultimate values may
enjoy continued consensus. 8 This requirement generates the need for
a normative grammar that extends beyond statements of fact, defini-
tions or contingent statements.9 Actual endorsement cannot be cap-
tured by descriptive hermeneutics alone. As Vico once wrote, in
history we are actors, in the sciences mere spectators."'0 It is this
suggestive observation that points to a Cartesian bias underlying
Hart's descriptive sociology and conceptual typology of rules that
keeps him within the confines of a circle-engendering (scientistic)
descriptive viewpoint."1
The beginnings of a middle way between moral obligation and
coercive obligation have been forged by Hart. His notion of legal
obligation eschews the extremes of Rousseau's utopian notion of wholly
internal sanctions and Hobbes' rather cynical idea regarding wholly
external sanctions. Instead, Hart roots obligation in legitimate
authority. I have suggested that in order to ensure this advance an
additional step needs to be taken. Hart's compelling norm alone, (what
I have described as the imperative, pre-moral content of Hart's natural
law), cannot adequately ground legal obligation. I submit that, in ad-
dition, general acceptance of discursive founding principles or ultimate
values is required. This step, sanctioned by the inner authority of
98. See MacCormick, supra note 69, at 13. The majority's "current truth" is
an insufficient test for truth per se; "free debate" among rival views is "essential
to test the strengths and weaknesses of moral and other theses and systems of
thought."
99. See J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 88-91 (1973); J. HABERMAS, COM-
MUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 34-68 (1979).
100. I. BERLIN, VICO AND HERDER 67 (1976).
101. The debate surrounding the descriptive ("neutral") observation of phe-
nomena versus active ("committed") interpretation remains lively in both contemporary
social theory and legal philosophy. See, e.g., Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought,
90 YALE L.J. 970, 987-89 (1981) (affirming the merits of "committed argument" in the
face of our cultural bias toward seeing law as an "empirical" science involving
"detached observation"). Fletcher states: "In the mode of committed argument, we
seek both to learn from the conflict in case law and to exercise responsibility for
the ongoing refinement of the legal system .... We have no choice but to mediate
between the indifference of neutrality and the distortion of argument." Id. at 1003;
R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM 45 (1983) (describing H.G. Gad-
amer's battle against the intrusion of method into hermeneutics and S. Wolin's attack
on "methodism"). Bernstein states: "Method is not innocent or neutral. It not only
presupposes an understanding of what constitutes an understanding of political life;
it has become a powerful factor in shaping (or rather misshaping) human life in the
modern world."
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conscience, preserves intact the key feature of the internal viewpoint,
namely, the voluntary endorsement of normative statements.
Cognizant of the need for some metaphysical grounding, and of
the deliberations characteristic of practical reason, this conclusion may
appear to capture an Aristotelian echo. Indeed, it suggests that ethics
(in its original sense as the nature of human character)"2 remains the
foundation for the legitimation of authority in the modern legal system.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I submit that Hart's concept of law is more open
than either his typology of rules or his minimum content of natural
law suggest. First, the two minimum conditions for the existence of
the legal system cannot be deemed necessary and sufficient in their
current form. Hart's understatement of the role of standards and prin-
ciples, and the deep inconsistencies in his definitions of primary and
secondary rules necessitate substantial revision in his typological
analysis. Second, Hart's attempt to ground normative standards in
the minimum content of natural law (a) fails to guarantee any minimum
moral content of rules (and thus leaves intact Kelsen's claim that law
may have any content) and (b) fails to ensure that the legal system
will eschew coercive obligation (and thus does not necessarily sup-
plant the Hobbesian reliance upon externally enforced laws).
To overcome some of these obstacles, I have suggested that the
compelling (or imperative/pre-moral) norm that underlies Hart's
minimum content of natural law must be supplemented by committed
endorsement of discursive founding principles or ultimate values. Thus
Shiner's unrealistic notion of general citizen aquiescence to secondary
rules may be replaced by what I believe to be a more plausible ac-
count, namely, general acceptance of ultimate values. Contingent
statements thus are supplemented by normative statements that
generate consensus. Once the core of obedience is principled in the
manner I have suggested, the ground for de facto authority is estab-
lished. This authority in conjunction with the de jure authority estab-
lished by secondary rules of recognition, adjudication and change, serve
to ensure the legitimate authority of the legal system.
102. This notion of "character" (qua ethos) seems also to comport with Alasdair
Maclntyre's understanding. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 29 (1981). "A character is
an object of regard by the members of the culture generally or by some significant
segment of them. He furnishes them with a cultural and moral ideal.... The character
morally legitimates a mode of social existence." Id.
According to MacIntyre, it is through character that moral and metaphysical
ideals and theories assume an embodied existence in the social world. Based on the
normative grammar I am proposing here, one might say that it is by choosing and
characterizing character that one engages in moral activity.
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The notion of legitimation that I have drawn from Hart's inter-
nal viewpoint presupposes the dignity and moral intelligence of the
individual. I contend that Austin's coercive obligation and Hart's
minimum content of natural law do not. In accordance with this no-
tion of legitimation, the ends of citizens are rooted not in some idea
of "natural necessity," but in freely chosen ultimate values.'" As Hart's
descriptive theory might suggest, preferred values are those gener-
ally shared in society. However, contrary to Hart's descriptive ap-
proach, I submit that social practice, although indicative of consen-
sus, is irreducible to the ultimate values upon which consensus (and
therefore legitimate authority) is based.
Thus, in addition to truisms about man and the world, and beyond
the prudential designs humans share, legitimate authority presupposes
a minimum "normative reality," intersubjectively recognized, as a
justified basis (the source of rightness) for trusting officials (with
power). This normative reality is discursively realized; that is, it
emerges out of the clash and exchange of views among diverse social
groups.' 4 This means that the lay public as well as the legal expert
need share in the struggle for consensus on ultimate values.' 5
At the outset of this essay, I suggested that shared value
preferences conform to shifting images of self which underlie and sus-
tain the founding principles of the social world. In concluding, I have
hinted, albeit in gingerly fashion, that the post-modern image of man
casts a wink at Hobbes and his hard, modern vision, and bows to an
ethic characteristic of Aristotle.
103. That is, by choosing a people ultimately constructs the reality of their
social world and of human nature itself. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note
12. See also J. WHITE, supra note 13, at 275.
104. Since no individual can claim a monopoly on truth and goodness, those
who would participate in normative discourse must remain open to the beliefs and
values of others. Each participant in the dialogue must be prepared to learn from
the dialogue itself. See Gibbard, supra note 36. See also Burt, Constitutional Law
and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 487 (1984) ("Dialogic engagement
provides the means to create mutual meaning on which the rule of law depends.");
Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) ("The challenge
presented by the absence of a single 'objective' interpretation is ... the need to maintain
a sense of legal meaning despite the destruction of any pretense of superiority of one
nomos over another.").
105. Compare H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 57-59 (citizens need only obey rules
of behavior which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity; only
officials (the "experts of the system") need accept as common critical standards of
official behavior rules of recognition-specifying the criteria of legal validity-along
with rules of change and adjudication) with THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 180 (A.
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("The obstacles to usurption and the facilities of
resistance increase with the increased extent of the state, provided the citizens under-
stand their rights and are disposed to defend them.").
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